Core Technical Takeaways
- >CVE-2026-63520 stems from an unrestricted .NET type instantiation and property-setting primitive in the DbTypeReflector class, which resolves arbitrary assembly-qualified type names from BDC model XML without any allowlist.
- >An attacker who can upload a malicious .bdcm model file and trigger entity execution can instantiate any .NET type in the Global Assembly Cache, set arbitrary properties, and use property-setter side effects to achieve OS command execution.
- >On its own the flaw is authenticated RCE; chained with the CVE-2026-55040 authentication bypass it becomes unauthenticated RCE running as the SharePoint site service account.
- >Multiple gadget chains are viable. Rapid7 demonstrated a Database LOB system with an ObjectDataProvider gadget, while VulnCheck used a DotNetAssembly LOB system with a LosFormatter gadget, so defenders must account for more than one exploitation pattern.
Overview of CVE-2026-63520
On August 11, 2026, Rapid7 and Microsoft disclosed CVE-2026-63520, a remote code execution vulnerability affecting Microsoft SharePoint. A remote authenticated attacker can execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable SharePoint server with the privileges of the SharePoint site's service account. When combined with the authentication bypass CVE-2026-55040, the resulting exploit chain is unauthenticated RCE. Rapid7 published its technical analysis on August 24, 2026, expediting a planned 30-day timeline because a third party had already published details.
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| CVE Identifier | CVE-2026-63520 |
| Related CVE | CVE-2026-55040 (authentication bypass, enables unauth chain) |
| Affected product | Microsoft SharePoint Server (analysis on Subscription Edition 16.0.19725.20210) |
| Attack vector | Network; authenticated RCE, or unauthenticated when chained |
| Execution context | SharePoint site service account |
| Vulnerable subsystem | Business Data Connectivity (BDC) |
Root cause: unrestricted .NET type instantiation in DbTypeReflector
The vulnerability exists in the SharePoint Business Data Connectivity (BDC) subsystem. The root cause is an unrestricted .NET type instantiation and property-setting primitive in the DbTypeReflector class, which resolves arbitrary assembly-qualified type names from BDC model XML without any allowlist or safety enforcement. An attacker who can upload a malicious .bdcm model file and trigger entity execution can instantiate any .NET type in the Global Assembly Cache (GAC), set arbitrary properties, and use property-setter side effects to achieve OS command execution.
Multiple viable gadget chains
More than one gadget chain achieves execution, a notable defensive concern:
| Analysis | LOB System | Gadget Chain |
|---|---|---|
| Rapid7 | Database Line-of-Business system |
ObjectDataProvider based gadget chain |
| VulnCheck | DotNetAssembly Line-of-Business system |
LosFormatter based gadget chain |
Rapid7 warns that other gadget chains may also be viable; signature-based detections keying on a single LOB system or gadget type will miss alternative exploitation patterns.
The authentication-bypass chain
CVE-2026-63520 on its own requires authentication, which limits exposure. The severity escalates when chained with CVE-2026-55040, an authentication bypass that converts authenticated RCE into unauthenticated RCE: an external attacker with no credentials can reach code execution on an internet-exposed SharePoint server. Perimeter exposure of SharePoint is the single most important risk variable.
Remediation
-
1.
Apply Microsoft's security update for SharePoint Server immediately, prioritizing internet-exposed instances where the CVE-2026-55040 + CVE-2026-63520 unauthenticated chain applies.
-
2.
Restrict SharePoint exposure at the network perimeter; remove public internet reachability for admin and BDC endpoints.
-
3.
Audit .bdcm model uploads and restrict BDC model publishing to trusted administrators.
-
4.
Build detections for both known gadget chains (
ObjectDataProviderviaDatabaseLOB andLosFormatterviaDotNetAssemblyLOB).
# Identify SharePoint Server build version
Get-SPProduct | Format-List Name, Version
# Review BDC model catalog for unexpected entries
Get-SPBusinessDataCatalogMetadataObject -BdcObjectType Model -ServiceContext http://localhost
# Audit IIS bindings for internet-exposed SharePoint web apps
Get-SPWebApplication | Select-Object Name, Url